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Abstract 
This paper investigates the behavior of capital buffers of Australian banks to changes in the business cycle. More 
particularly, whether there is a behavioral difference between big and small banks, and whether the 2008-09 global 
financial crisis influenced bank behavior with respect to capital buffers. Applying the Generalized Method of Moments 
technique, we find the evidence to support pro-cyclical behavior of large banks, but counter-cyclical of small banks. 
Our results also show that banks with large size, large risky portfolio, and high lending growth rate tend to hold less 
capital than their peers. Finally, our results suggest that the latest financial crisis did induce banks to hold more capital. 
Keywords: Australia, Business cycle, Capital buffers, Capital regulation, financial crisis. 
1. Introduction 
The 2008-09 global financial crisis has prompted market participants, regulators and rating agencies to reappraise the 
appropriate levels and forms of capital that banks should hold to deal with potential losses during economic downturns. 
As a result of these efforts, banks in a number of countries, including Australia, have come to maintain capital buffers 
above the regulatory minimum as a cushion to avoid financial distress and absorb losses in the case of turmoils. A 
capital buffer can be identified as the extra capital banks hold on top of the regulatory minimum. In Australia, banks are 
required to hold total capital of at least 8% of their risk-weighted assets, in which total capital is the sum of Tier 1 
(including ordinary shares and retained earnings, which make up most of the Tier 1 capital held by Australian banks, as 
well as some specific types of preference shares and convertible securities) and Tier 2 (predominantly consisting of 
subordinated debts) capital.  
The reasons why banks may hold capital beyond the minimum required level have been explained elsewhere in the 
banking literature. Firstly, banks generally tend to assess their risks differently from regulators. For instance, they are 
likely to use their own internal economic capital models to estimate appropriate bank-specific capital levels to hold, given 
their own assumptions and risk appetites (Jackson, 1999). Secondly, banks might need to hold excess capital in order to 
signal soundness to the market and satisfy the expectations of rating agencies. Thirdly, holding a capital buffer may bring 
advantages of future 'growth opportunities'. For instance, if facing a substantial increase in demand for loans, banks with 
relatively little capital may lose market share to those that are well capitalized (Jokipii & Milne, 2008). Finally, holding 
capital more than required by regulators may induce banks to screen and monitor borrowers more carefully (especially 
in the case that a bank cannot completely diversity risk in its loan portfolio – a key feature of banking in developing 
countries), thus the repayment probability tends to increase, which in turn leads to a lower cost of borrowing for 
businesses and households (Agenor, Alper, & Pereira da Silva, 2012). 
The relationship between bank capital buffers and the business cycle can go in either direction. Proponents of the idea 
that the link is primarily pro-cycle argue that banks tend to increase their capital buffers during upswings beyond what 
current risk fundamentals suggest. This accumulation of capital might be because banks take into account the possibility 
that risks may actually increase during upturns, and internalize the negative externalities of pro-cyclical requirements on 
macroeconomic stability (Ayuso, Pérez, & Saurina, 2004). On the other hand, advocates of counter-cyclicality believe 
that during booms banks tend to underestimate actual risk (i.e., in expanding credit) and they fail to appropriately judge 
the cyclical nature of output.  
The dependence of capital buffers on the business cycle may have a negative impact on macroeconomic stability. In 
theory, in the wake of losses, a bank can restore its capital ratio by either going to the market and raising fresh capital, 
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or leaving its capital unchanged and shrinking its asset base. However, ordinarily it is difficult for banks to raise capital 
during a bust. If a bank chooses to shrink its assets (e.g., by cutting back on lending), others can pick up the slack, 
which means market share is transferred from weaker and troubled institutions to their stronger peers. Nevertheless, if a 
large fraction of the financial system is in difficulty, a simultaneous attempt by many institutions to shrink their assets is 
likely to be more damaging still to the economy more broadly. 
Furthermore, capital buffers could provide an important macro-prudential instrument for monetary authorities and could 
help to stabilize the economy. Increasing bank capital requirements during upswings may have the secondary effect of 
moderating excessive credit growth and thus taking some of the „heat‟ out of an economic expansion. Similarly, 
reducing capital buffer requirements when economic and financial conditions are pessimistic might help relieve 
restraints on lending and keep monetary policy effective. 
The majority of the literature in this field has reported the existence of counter-cyclical behavior of bank capital, 
indicating they reduced their capital buffers during booms to take opportunities of good economic environment (see, for 
example, Ayuso et al., 2004 for Spanish banks; Marcucci & Quagliariello, 2008 for Italian banks; Stoltz & Wedow, 2011 
for German banks; Francis & Osborne, 2012 for UK bank; Guidara, Lai, Soumaré, & Tchana, 2013 for Canadian banks). 
Several cross-countries studies also report the same results. For instance, Chen and Hsu (2013) examining the behavior of 
bank capital in 171 developed and developing countries found that the capital buffers will decrease by 0.142% when GDP 
growth rate rises by 1%. Similarly, an adverse relationship between capital buffers and the business cycle was shown by 
Bikker and Metzemaker (2005) analyzing the bank capital buffers of 29 OECD countries, and Fonseca and Gonzalez 
(2010) investigating the determinants of bank capital buffers in 70 countries.  
The Basel Committee of Banking Supervision (BCBS) has set out a new global regulatory framework (commonly 
known as Basel III) for more resilient banks and banking systems. In particular, Basel III has introduced a new 
countercyclical capital buffer component which imposes a range of 0 - 2.5% of a bank‟s risk-weighted assets to be 
levied on top of the revised capital adequacy requirements. The main objective of these countercyclical capital buffers is 
to achieve the broader macroprudential goal of protecting banking sectors from taking on too much systemic risk as a 
result of excess credit growth (BCBS, 2010). The Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) has adopted the 
minimum Basel III capital requirements, in full, from 1 January 2013.
1
However, APRA does not include a requirement 
for a countercyclical capital buffer. The findings in this paper might offer some implications regarding this issue. 
It is of our interest to examine whether different types of banks (i.e., large versus small) behave differently when it 
comes to capital holdings. Jokipii and Milne (2008) report that capital buffers of large banks seem to fall during good 
times and rise during bad times, while capital buffers of small banks co-move positively with the business cycle. They 
explain the possible reason for this being that it is more costly for smaller banks to raise new capital, thus they rely 
more on retained earnings as a cushion against insolvency and illiquidity. Accordingly, they build up more capital 
buffers during economic expansion. Furthermore, because it costs more for smaller banks to borrow in the wholesale 
debt market, they are more dependent on deposits as a source of funding. Thus, it seems more difficult for them to 
respond to cyclical increases in loan demand than larger banks. In contrast, Guidara er al (2013), focusing on six largest 
Canadian banks, find that these banks have a larger capital buffer in expansion and in recession.  
This paper adds to the existing literature in two ways. Firstly, it adds another piece of empirical evidence to the literature 
which currently flooded with studies of capital buffers of EU banks, US banks, and elsewhere rather than in Australia. 
Secondly, the paper examines the effect of the latest financial crisis on the behavior of bank capital buffers. This allows us 
to predict the impact of shocks and risk appetite of Australian banks. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section II describes the methodology, while Section III explains the 
definitions of the variables. Section IV analyses the empirical findings, and Section V presents the conclusions. 
2. Methodology 
To test whether bank capital buffers change over the economic cycle or not we follow the methodology proposed by 
Ayuso et al. (2004) and Estrella (2004). We use a partial adjustment framework in which bank i seeks to attain its 
optimal capital buffer *
,i tBUF  given its observed capital buffer at time t – 1, , 1i tBUF  : 
                                                        
1
 According to APRA‟s proposal, all Australian authorized deposit-taking institutions (ADIs) will have to meet the requirements of 
4.5% of common equity capital to risk-weighted assets (increased from 2% under Basel II), 6.0% of Tier 1 capital ratio (increased 
from 4% under Basel II), and an 8% total capital ratio (which is the same as under Basel II). In addition, from 1 January 2016, ADIs 
are required to hold an additional 2.5% of common equity Tier 1 capital (known as a capital conservation buffer), thus raising the 
minimum common equity Tier 1 ratio to 7%. 
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 *, , , 1 ,i t i t i t i tBUF BUF BUF              (1) 
where 
, , , 1( )i t i t i tBUF BUF BUF     represents the observed change in capital buffers between two consecutive periods. 
Capital buffers (BUF) are defined as the difference between the capital to risk-weighted assets ratio the bank holds and 
the regulatory minimum (for the period under examination, 8%) required by APRA.  represents adjustment costs of 
the actual capital buffer toward its optimal level. 
In the absence of adjustment costs, then  =0, and from equation (1) it follows that *
, ,i t i tBUF BUF . This implies that 
banks can pick up any level of capital and move directly to its optimal level. In this case, banks would not hold extra 
capital rather than that required by law or by the markets. This situation happens if deposits are completely insured, 
depositors have no incentives to monitor bank shareholders and they accept a risk-free rate regardless of the risk to 
deposits. Accordingly, the optimal choice for banks is to hold the maximum amount of debt, and bank capital only 
varies in response to changes in risk-weighted assets (Fonseca & González, 2010). At the other extreme, when  =1 the 
model implies 
, , 1i t i tBUF BUF , suggesting that transaction costs are so large that the bank is stuck with the same 
capital ratio that it had at the beginning of the period. Thus, in the presence of high adjustment costs banks may not be 
able to change their desired capital buffers instantly via either equity issues or reducing assets. While the former option 
may convey negative information to the market on the bank‟s economic value, the latter may require a bank to sacrifice 
positive net present value projects or to sell assets at prices below their values. The tradeoff between the cost of holding 
capital and the cost of failure determines the optimum capital buffers (Shim, 2013). 
Equation (1) can be rewritten as:  
*
, , , 1 ,(1 )i t i t i t i tBUF BUF BUF              (2) 
Although the optimal capital buffer is unobservable, it depends on the stage of the business cycle, as well as 
bank-specific factors (Jopikii and Milne, 2008; and Stolz and Wedow, 2011). Therefore the estimated model is specified 
as follows: 
                          
'
, 1 , 1 2 , ,      i t i t t i t i tBUF BUF CYCLE X        (3) 
where CYCLEt is a measure of the business cycle at time t and is proxied by the growth rate of real GDP; ,i tX is a 
vector of bank-specific variables for bank i at time t, including bank size, risk, liquidity, profitability and lending 
growth. 
Technically, the estimation of Equation (3) may face several economic problems: (i) bank-specific variables may not be 
strictly exogenous, suggesting that causality might run in both directions, for instance from risk to capital buffers and 
vice versa, thus these regressors may be correlated with past and possibly current realization of the error; (ii) the 
presence of a lagged dependent variable 
, 1i tBUF  gives rise to autocorrelation; and (iii) fixed individual effects may be 
correlated with the explanatory variables. The fixed effects are contained in the error term ,i t , which includes the 
unobservable bank-specific effects, iu , and the observable specific error, ,i tv  (i.e., ,i t = iu + ,i tv ), where ,i tv  is 
assumed to be independent and identically distributed with zero mean. Therefore, to overcome these problems we 
employ the GMM approach suggested by Blundell and Bond (1998) to estimate Equation (3). This approach is superior 
to the conventional OLS in addressing potential endogeneity, heteroskedasticity, and autocorrelation problems in the 




3. Data and Variables 
The studied sample consists of 13 Australian banks over the period from 1993 to 2011. All data were collected from 
individual bank annual reports. Due to availability issues and mergers and acquisition activity, not all banks have the 
necessary data over the studied period. Thus there are 185 observations altogether. As noted earlier, in this paper a 
capital buffer (BUF) is defined as the deviation of the observed capital ratio of an individual bank in each year from the 
regulatory minimum level of capital of 8%. Our data for the sample period shows that Australian banks hold far more 
prudential capital than required by APRA. It was 3.85% on average over the sample period (as reported in Table 2). This 
fashion of large capital buffers have been found for US and EU banks (see Peura & Jokivuolle, 2004; Jokipii & Milne, 
2008).  
Following the literature, the business cycle is proxied by real GDP growth. A negative relationship between GDP 
growth and capital buffers would reflect risk-sensitive behavior. However, in case a positive relationship is found, it 
would reflect forward-looking and prudent behavior by reserving more in „fat‟ years to use in lean years.  
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the average capital buffers of the Australian banking sector and real GDP growth rates 
since 1993. There seems to have a negative relationship between capital buffers and the business cycle. In fact, the 
Pearson correlation coefficient between the two variables is -0.17 and significant. It is also worth noting that capital 
buffers rose quite dramatically since the onset of the GFC.  
 
Figure 1. Bank Capital Buffers and GDP Growth 
The level of a bank‟s capital buffer may depend on a number of bank-specific attributes, including bank size, asset risk, 
liquidity, profitability, and lending growth.  
As adopted widely in the literature, the natural logarithm of an individual bank‟s total assets is used as a proxy for bank 
size (SIZE). Big banks normally hold smaller capital buffers than small banks. This could be because large banks may 
enjoy more investment and diversification opportunities, more resilient to negative shocks, and thus don‟t need as large 
capital buffers as insurance against shocks. In addition, there is a common expectation (a “too big to fail” belief) that 
big banks will be bailed out by governments when they face financial distress. Francis and Osborne (2012) and Coffinet, 
Coudert, Pop, and Pouvelle (2012) found a negative relationship between bank size and capital ratios in the UK and 
French banking sectors respectively, implying that larger banks tend to hold relatively lower capital ratios on average. 
Bank risk (RISK) could be quantified by alternative measures such as the probability of default, value at risk, net loan 
loss provisions and write-downs over total assets, non-performing over total loans, or risk-weighted assets to total assets 
ratio. The last metric is commonly used to characterize the risk profile of bank assets and credit risk. The underlying 
principle for using this proxy, as explained by Shim (2013), is that the allocation of assets across different risk 
categories, which are assigned a weight to reflect the actual credit risk and to determine a bank‟s portfolio risk. 
Moreover, as Australian banks focus on traditional lending activities, credit risk is the most significant risk. Accordingly, 
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Liquidity (LIQUID) is measured by liquid assets (including cash at banks, money at short call, securities purchased 
under agreements to resell, bills receivable and remittances in transit) as a ratio of total assets. As banks with high 
liquidity have a greater ability to meet short time financial obligations, and can increase their capital buffers by 
liquidating these assets, they need less insurance against a possible violation of the minimum capital requirement (Stolz 
& Wedow, 2011). As a result, it is expected that the estimated parameter associated with LIQUID has a negative sign. 
Bank profitability is measured by expressing operating profit after tax as a ratio of book equity (ROE). Capital can be 
raised through the capital markets by issuing new equity or through retained earnings. The former is very costly, that is 
why banks normally use retained profit to raise capital buffers. Thus the relationship between profitability and capital 
buffers is expected to be positive, as indeed, is normally found in the literature (see, for instance, Coffinet et al., 2012). 
Annual loan growth (LOANG) is measured by the growth rate of credit demand between two consecutive years. A high 
lending rate would raise total assets relative to capital, and thus lower the capital buffer (Jokipii & Milne, 2008).  
It is, of course, also our intention to investigate the effect of bank size in the behavior of capital buffers over the 
business cycle, and whether the response of capital buffers to changes in the business cycle is more pronounced for big 
banks than for small banks. INTERACT is the multiplicative dummy of SIZE (a dummy equals to 1 for large banks, and 
0 otherwise) and GDP (a growth rate of GDP).
2
 If the coefficients on CYCLE and INTERACT are both negative (and 
significant), capital buffers of large banks react more intensively to changes in the business cycle. In other words, a 1% 
increase in the annual growth rate of GDP leads to a larger reduction of capital buffers for large banks than for small 
banks. This could happen because big banks have better access to equity markets than small banks, and thus can lower 
capital buffers during upswings without facing a high level of risk, while small banks do not have that opportunity. 
Furthermore, we are concerned whether the global financial crisis in 2008-2009 influenced the behavior of banks in 
Australia with respect to capital buffers. In particular, whether banks in Australia hold more capital after the crisis. A 
dummy GFC is equal to 1 if year is 2008 and onward, and 0 otherwise. It is expected that GFC has a positive sign.  
The definition of all variables in use is summarized in Table 1, while their descriptive statistics are displayed in Table 2. 
It is noteworthy that banks in Australia hold an average prudential capital ratio of 3.85% higher than the level required 
by the regulators, and given the gradually upward trend its high standard deviation suggests a significant differentiation 
of capital buffers across banks. For this fact, we assess whether the evolution of capital buffers over the business cycle 
would vary with bank size.  
Table 1. Definition of Variables 
  Definition 
BUF Observed capital to risk-weighted assets ratio minus 8% 
SIZE Natural log of total assets 
RISK Risk-weighted assets to total assets ratio 
LIQUID Liquid assets to total assets ratio 
ROE Annual net profit before tax to average equity 
LOANG Annual loan growth rate 
CYCLE Annual real GDP growth rate 
INTERACT The multiplicative dummy of LARGE (a dummy equals to 1 for four big banks, and 0 otherwise) and 
GDP 
GFC Equal 1 if year is after 2007; otherwise 0 
Table 2. Summary Statistics (1993-2011, 199 Observations) 
  Mean St.dev Minimum Maximum 
BUF 3.85 2.32 0.70 13.40 
SIZE 10.23 2.33 5.27 13.53 
RISK 58.47 14.68 27.07 94.48 
LIQUID 2.57 2.67 0.05 18.14 
ROE 14.95 5.54 -0.56 28.10 
LOANG 12.46 11.69 -12.00 62.87 
CYCLE 3.37 0.99 1.45 5.16 
INTERACT 1.31 1.79 0.00 5.16 
GFC 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 
Table 3 presents the correlation coefficients between the variables used in the model. It is important to firstly notice that 
                                                        
2
 In this paper, four major banks (including Commonwealth, ANZ, National Australia Bank, and Westpac) are 
considered as large banks, and other banks are small ones. 
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among those significant correlations at 5% (marked with an asterisk), there is no highly correlated relationship. As 
expected, capital buffers are negatively correlated with real GDP growth (-0.17), bank size (-0.39), and risk (-0.19). 
Likewise, there is a positive correlation of GDP growth with loan growth, the ratio of returns to equity, and the ratio of 
risk-weighted assets to total assets. These suggest that banks grant more loans, make higher profit, and turn toward 
riskier assets in upturns.  
Table 3. Correlation Matrix 
  BUF SIZE RISK LIQUID ROE LOANG CYCLE INTERACT GFC 
BUF 1.00         
SIZE -0.39* 1.00        
RISK -0.19* -0.06 1.00       
LIQUID 0.12 -0.06 0.03 1.00      
ROE -0.10 0.39* 0.08 0.02 1.00     
LOANG -0.30 -0.03 -0.02 0.07 0.25* 1.00    
CYCLE -0.17* -0.08 0.27* -0.15* 0.30* 0.21* 1.00   
INTERACT -0.43* 0.67* 0.33* -0.09 0.24* -0.06 0.27* 1.00  
GFC 0.22* 0.11 -0.31* 0.15* -0.35* -0.24* -0.60* -0.17* 1.00 
4. Empirical Findings 
The estimated results are presents in Table 4. It is worthwhile to note that, with a high p-value in the Sargan test, the 
null hypothesis that over-identifying restrictions are valid is not rejected. Furthermore, the Arellano – Bond test rejects 
the null hypothesis of no first-order autocorrelations, AR(1), in the residuals. This is attuned with the fact that the 
dynamic model has the first lag of the endogenous variable as one of the regressors. However, the null hypothesis of no 
second-order autocorrelation, AR(2), is not rejected, indicating that there is autocorrelation in levels. These tests signify 
that valid instruments are being used and the dynamic model is well specified. 
Table 4. GMM estimates, equation in first differences; Dependent: BUF 
           Coefficient             t-value 
BUF(t-1)  0.37***  4.36 
SIZE -0.80*** -2.71 
RISK -0.09*** -4.13 
LIQUID -0.4 -0.66 
ROE  0.03  1.21 
LOANG  -0.02* -1.91 
CYCLE -0.31** -2.61 
INTERACT  0.41**  2.14 
GFC 0.55* 1.77 
Sargan test Chi2 = 115.00 p-value =0.54 
AR(1) z-value = -6.12 p-value = 0.00 
AR(2) z-value =  0.43 p-value = 0.66 
Note: AR(1) and AR(2) represent first and second order residual autocorrelation test;  
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5, 1% levels of significance respectively.  
The coefficients of CYCLE and INTERACT are negatively and positively significant at 5% respectively, implying capital 
buffers of small banks respond negatively to changes in the business cycle, while those of big banks respond positively.
3
 
More specifically, a 1% increase in GDP growth leads to an average decrease of 0.31 percentage points in small banks‟ 
capital buffers, while it leads to an increase of 0.10 (-0.31+0.41) percentage points of large banks‟. In other words, big 
banks behave pro-cyclical, while smaller banks counter-cyclical.  
To trace out a plausible explanation for this heterogeneous result we need to look into insight changes of the 
components of capital buffers, namely bank capital (the sum of tier 1 and tier 2 capital) and risk-weighted assets. It 
                                                        
3
 We also examine if there is a commonly negative relationship between the business cycle and capital buffers of the 
Australian banking sector by dropping INTERACT. And we find that the coefficient on CYCLE is insignificant.  
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appears that during economic expansion, to make use of investment opportunities, both small and big banks draw down 
their capital level and just maintain enough to meet the regulatory requirement. Notably capital holdings of small banks 
falls at a faster rate (0.017%) compared to those of bigger banks (0.01%) for each 1% increase in GDP growth rate. 
Meanwhile, the risk-weighted assets of small banks swell slightly, while those of large banks shrink 0.014% per 1% 
increase in GDP. As a result, capital buffers of small banks decline, while capital buffers of large banks expand during 
upturns. In fact, large banks in Australia are accredited to use an Internal Ratings Based (IRB) approach whereby risk 
weights are derived from their own estimates of each exposure‟s probability of default, thus they can revise IRB risk 
estimates to reflect riskiness in each period.
 4
 Hence they adjust the risk weights to lower their risk-weighted assets 
during good times, leading to a slightly increase in capital buffers. It is noteworthy that, like their smaller counterparts, 
big banks also draw down their capital level during economic expansion to take advantage of investment and lending 
opportunities. Regulatory authorities should take into account this practice in the implementation of counter-cyclical 
capital buffer requirement.  
This interesting finding is in contrast with the one obtained by Jopikii and Milne (2008), who found that capital buffers 
of large banks in the EU15 behave counter- cyclically with the cycle and capital buffers of small banks behave 
pro-cyclically. In another study, García-Suaza, Gómez-González, Pabón and Tenjo-Galarza (2012) found that capital 
buffers of Colombian banks behave counter-cyclically, and capital buffers of large banks respond more intensively to 
changes in the business cycle than those of small banks.  
The statistically significant and relatively large coefficient on the lagged buffer shows the high degree of persistence in 
these capital buffers over the studied period. This finding supports the view that the costs of capital adjustment are an 
important explanation of the holding of large capital buffers (Jokipii & Milne, 2008). 
As regards to bank-specific variables, the estimation results show that the coefficient for bank size is highly significant 
and negative, indicating that larger banks tend to hold lower capital buffers than their smaller counterparts. In fact, the 
average capital buffer of large banks during the study period was 2.56% compared to 4.64% for small banks. As 
explained by Stoltz and Wedow (2011), there are a number of ways to explain for this distinction in bank capital buffers 
due to bank size. First, banks‟ operation efficiency is subject to asymmetric information which could be quite costly, 
thus they need to hold excessive capital to deal with any possible insolvent situations in addition to the practices of 
screening and monitoring reduce the asymmetry. If there are economies of scale in screening and monitoring, large 
banks should hold relatively less capital and instead undertake more monitoring and screening. Second, larger banks 
may have better investment and diversification opportunities. Thus, they are subject to a lower probability of a large 
negative shock to their capital and only need to hold a lower capital buffer as insurance against such a shock. Third, as 
evident in the real world, big banks will receive greater support from the government (such as financial bailout) when 
facing financial hardship (Shim, 2013). This finding is broadly in line with previous studies, including Stoltz and 
Wedow (2011), Garcia-Suaza et al. (2012), Francis and Osborne (2012), and Coffinet et al. (2012). 
RISK is significant and negative (although the scale is quite small) suggesting that risky banks possess smaller capital 
buffers. It is commonly expected in the banking literature that the risk level and bank capital holdings are positively 
correlated, meaning riskier banks would hold higher capital. Australian banks do follow this practice. However, their 
risk-weighted assets rise at a faster rate than their capital level do, the ratio of capital to the risk-weighted assets would 
fall and so do capital buffers.  
The coefficient LIQUID is negative but insignificant, implying that it is not certain that banks with a greater proportion 
of liquid assets embrace smaller or larger capital buffers.
5
 Similarly, the estimated coefficient ROE has the expected 
sign (i.e., positive) but is not significant, hence a bank‟s profitability has no influence on the direction of capital buffers 
even though banks might use retained profits to increase the capital cushion. To verify the unimportant effect of 
profitability on capital buffers, we employed the return to assets ratio (ROA) instead of ROE and obtained the same 
result. This finding is somewhat consistent with the fact the issuance of new equity and other forms of securities to raise 
capital account for around 70% of Tier 1 capital of Australian banks, while the remaining 30% from retained earnings 
(Gorajek & Turner, 2010).   
The coefficient LOANG is negatively significant, showing that a bank‟s loan growth influences change in capital 
                                                        
4
 Other banks use the standardized approach which specifies risk-weights for certain loans types. 
5
 Stolz and Wedow (2011) found an unexpected positive effect of liquidity on capital buffers. They explained this effect 
could be due to the fact that their liquidity measure includes share and bond holdings, thus banks hold capital buffers in 
order to provide for corresponding market risk.  
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buffers. That is, a 1% increase in the lending growth rate will lead to a fall of 0.02 percentage points in capital buffers 
on average. This can be explained by the fact that significant lending growth tends to increase risk-weighted assets, 
which in turn lowers the capital- assets ratio.  
Lastly, as predicted, the coefficient on GFC is positively significant, indicating that the 2008-09 financial crisis has had 
a large impact on the evolution of capital buffers. More specifically, the average capital buffer after the post-crisis 
period is 0.54% higher than the pre-crisis one. As explained in Gorajek and Turner (2010), the rise in capital in the 
Australian banking system post-GFC mostly reflects the large amount of new equity – the highest quality form of 
capital – that was issued in late 2008 and up to the middle of 2009, mainly through a combination of new share issuance 
and dividend reinvestment plans. The new share issues were at only modest discounts to the market price and were 
entirely to the private sector. There was no injection of public money into Australian banks. In addition, the raising of 
capital was also via increases in retained earnings via solid profits throughout the crisis. On the other hand, in response 
to the change in global attitudes, Australian banks adopted a more cautious growth and composition strategy with 
respect to their loan portfolios, thus limiting increases in risk weighted assets.  
5. Conclusions 
With a focus on examining the behavior of Australian banks‟ capital buffers, this study finds that capital buffers of large 
banks rises during economic upturns, while those of small banks fall in the same period. The behavior of large banks is 
attributed to the fact that they are accredited to use their own IRB approach to adjust the risk weights to lower the 
risk-weighted assets during good times, thus pushing the capital buffers up accordingly, while the level of capital level 
actually falls during this period. Given the current practice of Australian banks, the consideration of counter-cyclical 
bank regulations may be necessary to guarantee that capital buffers of all Australian banks will soar up during peak 
times and they should be driven by the increase in capital level. 
Our results further suggest that banks with large total assets as a measure of bank size, a high ratio of risk-weighted 
assets to total assets, and high loan growth rates appear to hold lower capital buffers than other banks. In examining the 
effect of the latest global financial crisis, we uncover that banks tend to improve their capital position after crises. 
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